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We investigated the extent to which emotionally valenced 
words automatically cue spatio-motor representations. 
Participants made speeded button presses, moving their hand 
upward or downward while viewing words with positive or 
negative valence. Only the color of the words was relevant to 
the response; on target trials, there was no requirement to read 
the words or process their meaning. In Experiment 1, upward 
responses were faster for positive words, and downward for 
negative words. This effect was extinguished, however, when 
words were repeated. In Experiment 2, participants performed 
the same primary task with the addition of distractor trials. 
Distractors either oriented attention toward the words’ 
meaning or toward their color. Congruity effects were 
increased with orientation to meaning, but eliminated with 
orientation to color. When people read words with emotional 
valence, vertical spatio-motor representations are activated 
highly automatically, but this automaticity is modulated by 
repetition and by attentional orientation to the words’ form or 
meaning. 
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Introduction 
Do some abstract concepts depend, in part, on mental 
representations of physical space? According to theories of 
metaphorical mental representation, linguistic metaphors 
like ‘a rising price’, ‘a sliding scale, or ‘a long engagement’ 
suggest that many of our abstract ideas are grounded in 
representations of motion and space. These are, in turn, 
grounded directly in perceptuo-motor experiences (e.g., 
Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Talmy, 1988). 
Although initial arguments for metaphor theory were based 
on descriptive linguistic data, psychological experiments 
provide evidence for important links between spatio-motor 
representations and mental representations in more abstract 
domains like power (Schubert, 2005), happiness (Meier & 
Robinson, 2004), time (Boroditsky, 2000), number 
(Dehaene et al., 1993), and similarity (Casasanto, 2008). Yet 
researchers are just beginning to specify what roles spatial 
representations may play in abstract thought.  
Debates about metaphorical representation have focused 
on two theoretical possibilities outlined by Murphy (1996), 
which were impossible to distinguish based on 
observational linguistic data, alone. On the Strong View, 
representations in metaphorical source domains (e.g., space) 
are necessary for conceptualizing target domains (e.g., 
time). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), activating 
source-target mappings is obligatory: without them, 
“abstract thought is virtually impossible.” On the Weak 
View, however, source domain representations make an 
optional contribution to people’s understanding of target 
domains. Boroditsky (2000) tested whether spatial 
representations are necessary for understanding temporal 
language, and concluded that “spatial schemas are useful, 
but not necessary” (italics added).  
Framing experiments in terms of the necessity of source 
domain representations for understanding target domains 
(and for understanding target-domain language in particular) 
helped to transform a question that was long the province of 
linguists and philosophers into a question that is tractable 
using the psychologist’s toolkit. Yet continuing to test a 
Strong-Weak dichotomy seems unlikely to lead to further 
new discoveries.  
On nearly any theory of metaphor, source domain 
representations are hypothesized to be part of a more 
complex mental representation or word meaning: on the 
Strong View, a necessary part. The idea that there are 
necessary parts (i.e., features) of concepts or word 
meanings, however, is difficult to maintain. Wittgenstein 
(1953) famously exploded the notion that even a simple, 
relatively concrete word like game has any features that are 
necessarily present in all of its instantiations. It seems 
unlikely that more abstract words like value or justice, 
whose meanings are notoriously fluid, would have any 
necessary parts.  This suggests the necessity question should 
be reframed in terms of functionality: What causes source 
domain representations to be activated, and what functional 
roles do they play in understanding target domains? 
Psychologists have also raised a related question about 
metaphor (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, et al., 
2007): Are source domains activated automatically when 
people understand target domains? Automaticity is of 
interest because it is taken as evidence against the 
possibility that source-domain representations are only 
activated strategically (perhaps consciously) when people 
need to communicate about abstract ideas, or in response to 
task demands (Meier, et al., 2007). Curiously, however, 
automaticity has been treated as binary; source domains 
either are or are not activated automatically. Yet for most 
aspects of concepts and word meanings, it seems unlikely 
that activation is fully automatic − not in the same sense that 
people automatically perceive the lines in the Müller-Lyer 
illusion to be of different lengths. As classic studies of 
‘semantic flexibility’ suggest, context can modulate the 
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 activation of even those aspects of a word’s meaning that 
might seem to be indispensable (e.g., Barclay, et al., 1974). 
Notions of automaticity that are well-suited for 
characterizing aspects of perceptual and motor processes 
may not be appropriate for characterizing aspects of 
meaning: meaning is not a reflex. 
Traditional notions of necessity and automaticity must be 
tailored to fit questions about metaphor (and about meaning, 
more broadly). Rather than asking whether source domains 
are necessary for understanding target domains, it may be 
more fruitful to ask ‘what functional roles do source-domain 
representations play in understanding target domains?’ 
Rather than investigating whether source domain 
representations are activated automatically, it may be useful 
to ask ‘to what extent is their activation automatic, and 
under what conditions is their activation increased or 
diminished?’ We take up these latter questions of 
automaticity here, assuming automaticity to be a continuum.  
Emotional valence is an abstract domain that people often 
talk about using metaphors from space and motion: when 
people are optimistic they’re looking up, and when they’re 
sad they’re feeling down; hopes can rise; morale can drop; 
spirits can soar or plummet. Behavioral studies suggest 
these linguistic metaphors correspond to mental metaphors: 
non-linguistic associative mappings from representations of 
motion or space to the representations of emotional valence. 
Stroop-like experiments show these mappings are activated 
when people process language with positive or negative 
valence, even when they’re not using any linguistic 
metaphors.  
In one study (Meier & Robinson, 2004), participants were 
faster to judge words like polite and rude as having positive 
or negative valence when positive words were presented at 
the top and negative words at the bottom of a computer 
screen (Experiment 1). Furthermore, judging words to be 
positive directed attention to the top of the computer screen, 
and judging them to be negative directed attention to the 
bottom (Experiment 2). Yet based on these experiments it 
would be premature to conclude that space-valence 
associations are ‘automatic’. For one thing, the spatial 
variation from trial to trial was highly salient in Meier & 
Robinsons’ experiments (in fact, impossible to ignore), and 
for another, participants made explicit judgments about the 
valence of the words. Thus, the tasks strongly focused 
attention on both the source and target domains.  
To address these concerns, Casasanto (2008) adapted a 
spatial interference task of Zwaan & Yaxley’s (2003) for 
use with valenced words. Participants saw pairs of words, 
one above and the other below fixation, and made speeded 
synonym-antonym judgments. Target word pairs were 
antonyms, one with positive and the other with negative 
valence. Participants were fastest to classify the pairs as 
antonyms when the positive word appeared above the 
negative (e.g., wealthy above poor). In a second experiment, 
participants were faster to make lexical decisions on 
positive-valence words (e.g., brave, ethical) when they were 
presented above non-word distractors, and on negative-
valence words (e.g., failure, hate) when presented below 
non-word distractors. This was true even though neither the 
spatial position of the words, nor their valence, nor any 
other part of their meaning was relevant to the task.  
In a third experiment, Casasanto (2008) presented positive 
and negative words in the center of a screen, in either red or 
blue letters. On the right and left of the screen there were 
three large boxes. The top box was red and the bottom box 
was blue (or vice versa). The middle box was white, and 
was filled with marbles. Participants were instructed that as 
soon as each word appeared, they should move one marble 
with each hand into the box corresponding to the color of 
the word’s font, as quickly as possible. They moved marbles 
fastest when the direction of movement was congruent with 
the spatial schema suggested by the word’s valence. This 
was true even though movements were cued only by the 
words’ colors: not only was their meaning irrelevant, the 
tasks did not even require participants to process the words 
as words. 
These Stroop-like congruity effects suggest that spatial 
representations are activated with a considerable degree of 
automaticity when people read valenced words. The goal of 
the present study was to test the limits of this automaticity. 
In Experiment 1, we tested whether repeating stimuli 
modulated the magnitude of the space-valence congruity 
effect. Casasanto’s (2008) marble-moving task was adapted 
for use with button presses, to automate response coding. 
Stimuli were presented twice, in successive blocks, and 
reaction times were compared across blocks. In Experiment 
2, we tested whether attentional orientation influenced the 
magnitude of space-valence congruity effects. We used a 
Task Set Inertia manipulation (Allport & Wylie, 2000). 
Distractor trials oriented attention during the target trials 
toward either semantic or perceptual aspects of the target 
words.  
Experiment 1: Does repetition modulate 
motor-meaning congruity effects? 
Experiment 1 tested whether motor-meaning congruity 
effects observed in previous studies would be modulated by 
repetition of the same stimulus words.  
Methods 
Participants Native English-speaking UC Berkeley 




Two lists of 48 English words were created, one with 
positive and the other with negative valence (e.g., wealthy, 
poor, virtuous, evil, joy, disgust, etc.), totaling 96 stimuli. 
The words were nouns and adjectives that have no literal 
spatial meaning, but which subjects in a previous norming 
study spatialized consistent with their metaphorical 
associations (e.g., placing wealthy above poor; virtuous 
above evil, etc.) Positive and negative words did not differ 
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 in frequency (p=0.70), number of syllables (p=0.60), or 
number of letters (p=0.12), by two-tailed t-tests.  
Stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor with a refresh 
rate of 60 Hz. A standard QWERTY keyboard was mounted 
vertically directly underneath the monitor, and participants 
responded using three of the keys: top (the A key), bottom 
(the apostrophe key), and middle (the H key). The top and 
bottom keys were colored green and purple, and the 
assignment of colors to keys was counterbalanced across 
participants. The middle key was always colored white. 
 
Procedure All 96 words were presented one at a time in 
random order in block 1, and again in a new random order 
in block 2. Half of the words were in green letters and half 
in purple letters. The assignment of colors to words was the 
same for both blocks within-subjects, and counterbalanced 
between subjects. 
Participants began each trial by holding down the middle 
(white) key with the pointer or middle finger of the 
dominant hand. A fixation cross appeared for 1000ms-
1500ms on a rectangular distribution (to prevent 
anticipatory releases of the middle key). When the fixation 
disappeared, a word appeared in the center of the screen for 
2000 ms in lowercase, bold 28-point Arial font (purple or 
green), on a black background. Participants were instructed 
to release the white key and press the key matching the 
color of the text as quickly as possible. Only the color of the 
word was relevant to the response: the word’s meaning was 
irrelevant, and the direction of the response was incidental. 
But because the purple and green keys were positioned 
vertically, one above the other, each key press required the 
participant to make either an upward or a downward 
movement. After pressing the colored key, participants 
returned their finger to the white key. Pressing the white key 
initiated the next trial. 
The color of the words was orthogonal to their valence. 
Therefore, for half of the trials the direction of the correct 
response was congruent with the valence of the word (e.g., 
if the word joy appeared in green and the green key was on 
top), and for the other half of the trials direction and valence 
were incongruent (e.g., if the word joy appeared in purple 
and the purple key was on bottom).  
Participants received warning messages, displayed for 
2500 ms, if they released the middle key too early (less than 
200 ms after word onset) or too late (more than 1000 ms 
after word onset). Participants performed 16 practice trials 
prior to the first block. Halfway through each block, they 
were given a rest, and chose when to continue.  
Results and Discussion  
Accuracy  
Participants pressed the correct button for over 99% of 
trials. Accuracy did not differ as a function of congruity or 
block (t-values<1).  
 
Reaction Times  
We collected two reaction times: Release Time (measured 
from the onset of the word to the release of the middle white 
key), and Press Time (measured from the onset of the word 
to the press of the colored key). From these we computed 
Travel Time (Press Time - Release Time). Trials for which 
Press Time was more than two standard deviations from the 
participant’s mean were excluded from further analysis (143 
out of 3840 trials, 3.7%).  
 
Release Times Mean Release Times are given in fig 1a-b. 
Omnibus 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs showed a 3-way interaction of 
Direction (upward, downward), Valence (positive, 
negative), and Presentation (first, second), both by subjects 
(F1(1,19)=5.95, p=.03) and by items (F2(1,94)=5.83, p=.02). 
The predicted motor-meaning congruity effect would be 
indicated by a 2-way interaction of Direction × Valence. 
There were no significant 2-way interactions in the data 
from both presentations, combined (all F’s<1), so separate 
2-way ANOVAs were conducted to test for this effect 
within each block.  
Presentation 1 showed the predicted Direction × Valence 
interaction (F1(1,19)=4.67, p=.04; F2(1,94)=3.26, p=.07). 
Presentation 2 showed a slight trend in the opposite 
direction, but the Direction × Valence interaction did not 
approach significance (F1(1,19)=1.60, ns; F2(1,94)<1, ns).  
 
Press Times Mean Press Times are given in Figure 1c-d. 
Omnibus 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs showed a 3-way interaction of 
Direction (upward, downward), Valence (positive, 
negative), and  Presentation (first, second), by subjects and 
by items (F1(1,19)=9.17, p=.007; F2(1,94)=3.72, p=.06).  
Presentation 1 considered alone showed the predicted 
Direction × Valence interaction (F1(1,19)=4.43, p=.05; 
F2(1,94)=3.32, p=.07). Presentation 2 showed a slight trend 
in the opposite direction, but the Direction × Valence 
interaction did not approach significance (F1(1,19)=2.84, ns; 
F2(1,94)<1, ns).  
Overall, there was a strong main effect of direction for 
Press Times (F1(1,19)=131.62, p=.0001; F2(1,94)=764.76, 
p=.0001), which was not present for Release Times. This 
effect appears to be an artifact of kinematic differences 
between top and bottom key presses, which used different 
muscle groups due to the positioning of the keyboard. This 
main effect is not relevant to the predicted motor-meaning 
congruity effect. 
 
Travel Times Neither the omnibus 3-way ANOVAs nor the 
separate 2-way ANOVAs testing relationships between 
Direction and Valence in Presentation 1 and Presentation 2 
showed any interactions that approached significance. This 
suggests that congruity effects arise during action planning 
rather than action execution. 
 
In summary, we found the predicted Direction × Valence 
interaction only during the first presentation of the stimulus 
words. This motor-meaning congruity effect was absent 
when words were presented a second time (in Block 2). To 
test the effect of repetition directly, we compared the 
magnitude of the congruity effect (incongruent trials - 
1942
 congruent trials) across blocks, both for Release Times 
(t1(19)=2.46, p=.02; t2(95)=2.37, p=.02) and Press Times 
(t1(19)=3.02, p=.007; t2(95)=1.95, p=.05). Repetition 
significantly reduced the effect of congruity between 
movement direction and valence.  
 
 
Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1. Top: RT measured from the 
release of the middle key for Presentation 1 (1a) and Presentation 2 
(1b). Bottom: RT measured from the press of the colored key for 
Presentation 1 (1c) and Presentation 2 (1d). Error bars indicate 
s.e.m. 
Experiment 2: Does attentional orientation 
modulate motor-meaning congruity effects? 
What accounts for the disappearance of the congruity effect 
when words are repeated? On one possibility, participants 
may have become so efficient at performing the task that 
there was no opportunity to detect any interference from 
irrelevant dimensions of the stimuli: a ceiling effect. Yet an 
increase in efficiency should result in an overall decrease in 
reaction times from Presentation 1 to Presentation 2. Since 
we found no main effect of Presentation, this explanation is 
not well supported. 
Alternatively, it may be that with practice, participants 
are better able to attend to the relevant dimension of the 
stimuli (their color) as opposed to irrelevant dimensions 
(their valence, and more generally their meaning). To test 
this explanation, for Experiment 2 we adapted Allport & 
Wylie’s (2000) Task Set Inertia paradigm. Target trials were 
the same as in Experiment 1, but distractor trials were 
added. For one group of participants, the distractor trials 
oriented attention toward the meanings of the target words. 
For the other group, distractors oriented attention toward the 
target words’ colors. We compared reaction times across 
groups to determine whether attentional orientation 
modulates the magnitude of space-valence congruity effects. 
Methods 
Participants Native English-speaking UC Berkeley 
students (N=48) participated for course credit or payment. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The experimental apparatus for Experiment 2 was the same 
used in Experiment 1. The primary task was identical to 
Presentation 1 of Experiment 1, except that 48 distractor 
trials were added, randomly intermixed with the 96 target 
trials, for a total of 144 trials. Participants were assigned to 
perform one of the two versions of the task, one with 
distractors designed to orient attention to the Meaning of 
target words, and the other to the Color of target words.  
Responses to these distractors were not recorded. 
Stimuli in the Meaning Orientation condition were 24 
concrete nouns, half referring to animate and half to 
inanimate objects. Whereas target words were shown in 
purple or green letters, distractors were in white letters. 
Participants performed a go/no-go animacy judgment, 
releasing and then re-pressing the middle white button to 
indicate the distractor word named something animate. In 
the Color Orientation condition, a 2×2 grid of grey squares 
appeared. On half of the trials the grid was empty, and on 
the other half an unsaturated red “X” appeared in one of the 
squares, balanced across the 4 positions. Participants 
performed a go/no-go X-detection judgment, re-pressing the 
middle white button to indicate that a red X was present.  
Only one block of trials was performed, and brief rests 
were provided twice, after the first 48 trials and then after 
the next 96 trials. 
Initially, 16 participants were assigned to each of the 
distractor conditions. Upon preliminary analyses, the 
predicted congruity effect was present in the Meaning 
Orientation condition but not in the Color Orientation 
condition. Sixteen new participants were added to the Color 
Orientation condition, to ensure that the absence of a 
congruity effect was not due to lack of statistical power. 
Since results for the second cohort did not differ from 
results in the first, data from both cohorts were combined 
for the analyses reported here.  
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy  
Participants correctly pressed the button corresponding to 
the color of the word for 100% of target trials. Performance 
on distractor trials was not analyzed.  
 
Reaction Times  
Omnibus 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs showed no significant 3-way 
interaction of Direction (upward, downward), Valence 
(positive, negative), and Distractor Type (Meaning, Color). 
The Press Time data showed the predicted 2-way interaction 
of Direction and Valence in the Meaning Orientation 
condition (F1(1,15)=6.12, p=.03; F2(1,94)=4.23, p=.04), but 
not in the Color Orientation condition (F1(1,31)=.11, ns; 
F2(1,94)=.55, ns). A slight trend toward the same Direction 
× Valence interaction in the Meaning Orientation condition 
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 was found for Release Times (F1(1,15)=1.61, p=.22; 
F2(1,94)=1.57, p=.21) and Travel Times (F1(1,15)=4.81, 
p=.05; F2(1,94)=.82, p=.37). The absence of a significant 
effect on Release Times was unexpected, given the results 
of Expt. 1. This may have been the result of noise 
introduced into the early phase of target responses when 
participants were required to task-switch following 
distractor trials. 
To test the predicted effect of attentional orientation on 
Press Times directly, we compared the magnitude of the 
congruity effect (incongruent trials - congruent trials) across 
conditions. According to a Wilcoxon signed rank test, the 
congruity effect was greater in the Meaning Orientation 
condition (15.1 ms) than in the Color Orientation condition 
(1.7 ms; difference of means=13.4 ms, W=176, p=.04, one-
tailed). Orienting attention toward Meaning or toward Color 
during distractor trials modulated the size of the motor-
meaning congruity effect observed during target trials. 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2. Space-valence congruity 
effects were found for target trials when distractors oriented 
attention to word meaning but not to word color. Error bars 
indicate s.e.m. 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we show effects of congruity between 
the valence of a word and the spatial direction of the 
response it cued. In both experiments participants responded 
only to the color of the target words, pressing the button that 
matched in color. The spatial directions of the responses 
were task-irrelevant, as were the meanings of the words. 
Still, participants responded fastest when the direction of the 
response and the valence of the word were in agreement: 
upward movements for positive-valence words, and 
downward for negative-valence words. The presence of 
space-valence congruity effects even during shallow, 
incidental processing of both space and valence suggests 
that the spatial component of the words’ meanings was 
activated with a high degree of automaticity.  
Both experiments also illustrate that automaticity has its 
limits. In Experiment 1, the motor-meaning congruity effect 
was found only during the first presentation of the stimuli, 
but not upon their repetition. Since there was no overall 
reduction in response times between Presentation 1 and 
Presentation 2, the extinction of the congruity effect does 
not appear to be a ceiling effect. 
Experiment 2 tested an alternative explanation for the 
effect of repetition: perhaps with practice, participants 
became more adept at focusing on the task-relevant 
dimension of the stimuli (their color) rather than the task-
irrelevant dimension (their meaning). Consistent with this 
proposal, when distractor trials oriented participants to the 
meaning of the target words, a strong congruity effect was 
found. By contrast, when distractor trials oriented 
participants to the color of the target words the congruity 
effect disappeared. 
It is possible to interpret both the repetition effect (in 
Expt. 1) and the Task Set Inertia effect (in Expt. 2) as 
effects of attention. During the initial presentation of the 
words in Expt. 1 and in the Meaning Orientation condition 
of Expt. 2, participants failed to fully disregard the task-
irrelevant meanings of the target words, one component of 
which is a spatial (or spatio-motor) representation with a 
certain direction. During the second presentation in Expt. 1 
and the Color Orientation condition of Expt. 2, participants 
more successfully attended to the target words’ colors. In 
Expt. 1, this was because the participants became better at 
restricting attention to the task-relevant dimension of the 
stimuli, as a result of practice. In Expt. 2, this was because 
of attentional ‘inertia’ from the colored-letter-detection 
distractor task.  
Although this standard interpretation may be valid, there 
is a potential alternative that does not rely on the construct 
of attention (“psychology’s Weapon of Mass Explanation”, 
according to Vincent Walsh (2003). Implicit in the 
attentional account is an assumption that reading a word 
activates its meaning. On standard psycholinguistic theories, 
the meaning of a word is retrieved from the mental lexicon, 
much the way a definition can be looked up in a dictionary. 
Then attention determines how strongly the word’s meaning 
is activated, and which aspects of the meaning are 
highlighted.  
On alternative accounts of the mental lexicon, however 
(e.g., Elman, 2004), words don’t have meanings; rather, 
words are cues to activate stored information. The particular 
constellation of information that gets activated in any 
instance depends both on the cue, per se, and on the context 
in which the cue is encountered. As a consequence, a word’s 
meaning is unlikely to ever be the same over successive 
experiences (see James, 1892/2001). ‘Meaning’, then, is 
nothing more (or less) than the effect that the word-in-
context has on the representations formed in the mind of its 
reader (or hearer).  
On this dynamic view of word meaning, our stimulus 
words cued the activation of spatio-motor representations in 
some contexts more than in others. The results of the first 
block of Expt. 1 suggest that the target words typically cue 
upward or downward spatio-motor representations such that 
these representations were activated even though they are 
irrelevant to the task at hand. But the same words serve as 
weaker cues for activating such task-irrelevant 
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 representations in contexts where the participant’s 
experience (either with the preceding block of target trials or 
with the intermixed distractor trials) has adjusted the cue 
validity of the words’ color relative to validity of other 
pieces of information associated with the words, such as 
their valence.  
Ordinarily, for the words we used as stimuli, valence has 
high cue validity and the color of the ink has low cue 
validity: reading that someone is a hero is normally a valid 
cue that the reader should construe the referent positively, 
regardless of the color hero is printed in. But the typical cue 
validity of words’ color and valence is reversed in our tasks, 
because of the tasks’ goals. Seeing a word in green letters is 
a valid cue that the item should be construed as a member of 
the category of “up-words” (or “down-words”), regardless 
of the word’s valence or other aspects of its meaning. The 
weights that participants assign to Color and Meaning as 
cues, it seems, can be adjusted by the experience of doing 
the primary task repeatedly, or by the addition of distractor 
trials that require either color processing or meaning to be 
processed exclusively. 
The present data may be equally consistent with the first 
proposed account (that words have meanings and attention 
determines which parts of their meanings get activated) and 
with the second (that words are cues, and the same cues 
activate different sets of information depending on the 
contexts in which they are encountered). Arguably, the 
second view is preferable on grounds of parsimony: the 
appearance and disappearance of space-valence congruity 
effects can be explained based on contextual modulation of 
retrieval cue weights, alone, rather than on retrieval 
dynamics and the intervention of attention. Distinguishing 
these accounts definitively will require further experiments.  
Conclusions 
Some versions of metaphor theory propose that source 
domain representations are activated automatically when 
people process words or concepts in target domains (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1999). Experimental results have been 
interpreted as evidence for this automaticity (e.g., Meier & 
Robinson, 2004). Here we show that, indeed, spatio-motor 
representations are activated with a surprising degree of 
automaticity when people read words with positive or 
negative emotional valence. Space-valence congruity effects 
are found even when both space and valence are processed 
shallowly and incidentally.  
The present results make clear that automaticity has its 
limits. The magnitude of space-valence congruity effects 
was modulated both by repetition of the valenced words and 
by a Task Set Inertia manipulation (Allport & Wylie, 2000). 
Spatio-motor representations may be activated by default 
when people read valenced words, but their activation is 
also context-dependent. These results are consistent with 
dynamic views of mental metaphor and of meaning 
construction, more broadly (Elman, 2004; Evans, 2009; 
Feldman, 2006).  
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